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ARTICLE

The Employment Standards Enforcement Gap
and the Overtime Pay Exemption in Ontario
Mark P. Thomas, Leah F. Vosko, Eric Tucker,
Mercedes Steedman, Andrea M. Noack, John Grundy,
Mary Gellatly, and Lisa Leinveer

Introduction: Employment Standards and
the Problem of Exemptions
While employment standards (es) legislation is designed to provide
a general set of minimum standards for a labour market, it often includes
exemptions and special rules that subject specifed categories of workers to
selective treatment. Diferential treatment under es is typically justifed in
relation to the particularities of sector, industry, or occupation, often leading
to a lowering or an absence of regulatory protections for the given group of
workers. With the rise in precarious employment across industrialized labour
markets – characterized by growing levels of uncertainty, lack of control over
the labour process, limited access to regulatory protection, and low income –
the question of exemptions and their connection to precarious employment
has received attention in recent scholarship.1 Tis attention points to the ways
in which exemptions may contribute to the exclusion from labour and employment laws of already marginalized groups of workers, thereby heightening
their precariousness. Guy Davidov locates this tendency within a legislative
“coverage crisis” that has grown over the last several decades of neoliberalism.2
1. Leah Vosko, “Precarious Employment: Towards an Improved Understanding of Labour
Market Insecurity,” in Leah Vosko, ed., Precarious Employment: Understanding Labour Market
Insecurity in Canada (Montréal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2006), 3.
2. Guy Davidov, “Setting Labour Law’s Coverage: Between Universalism and Selectivity,”
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 34, 3 (2014): 543.
Mark P. Tomas, Leah F. Vosko, Eric Tucker, Mercedes Steedman, Andrea M. Noack, John
Grundy, Mary Gellatly, and Lisa Leinveer, “Te Employment Standards Enforcement Gap and
the Overtime Pay Exemption in Ontario,” Labour/Le Travail 84 (Fall 2019): 25–51,
https://doi.org/10.1353/llt.2019.0032.

26 / LABOUR /LE TRAVAIL 84

Positing that coverage by labour and employment laws can be understood on
a continuum from universality to selectivity, Davidov asserts that in recent
decades, there has been a shift back toward greater selectivity in terms of
establishing coverage. Coupled with labour-market change that has altered
employment structures, in many national contexts this shift has resulted in
growing numbers of workers left outside the scope of labour and employment
laws. Tis omission afects workers in new forms of employment relationships: for example, those (mis)classifed as independent contractors; those
who are highly marginalized in more traditional forms of employment, such
as migrant workers in agricultural, domestic, and caregiving work; and many
in between. In the Canadian context, scholarship examining exemptions of
agricultural workers from occupational health and safety legislation and collective bargaining, and of temporary migrant workers from labour relations
and es legislation, has noted such tendencies.3
Set in the context of Ontario, Canada, this article explores the connections between es exemptions and precarious employment through the study
of the overtime pay exemption in the province’s Employment Standards Act
(esa).4 Ontario’s esa was designed to provide minimum employment standards for the majority of workers in the province, in particular for those with
limited bargaining power. In addition, the esa was initially characterized by
the Ontario Ministry of Labour as an attempt to promote the adoption of
“socially desirable” conditions of employment.5 Tus, minimum es legislation
was conceived as a form of workplace protection for those most vulnerable to
employer exploitation in an unregulated market and, as such, a means to raise
standards in the labour market more generally. At the time of the enactment of
the esa, the government claimed that the legislation was intended to provide
protection against exploitation while it simultaneously constructed the act to
account for variations in types of work, by industry and by sector through
3. Bob Barnetson, “Te Regulatory Exclusion of Agricultural Workers in Alberta,” Just Labour:
A Canadian Journal of Work and Society 14 (Autumn 2009): 50; Barnetson, “No Right to Be
Safe: Justifying the Exclusion of Alberta Farm Workers from Health and Safety Legislation,”
Socialist Studies 8, 2 (2012): 134; Eric Tucker, “Will the Vicious Circle of Precariousness
Be Unbroken? Te Exclusion of Ontario Farm Workers from the Occupational Health and
Safety Act,” in Vosko, ed., Precarious Employment, 3; Tucker, “Farm Worker Exceptionalism:
Past, Present, and the post-Fraser Future,” in Fay Faraday, Judy Fudge & Eric Tucker, eds.,
Constitutional Labour Rights in Canada: Farm Workers and the Fraser Case (Toronto: Irwin
Law, 2012), 30; Judy Fudge & Fiona MacPhail, “Te Temporary Foreign Worker Program in
Canada: Low-Skilled Workers as an Extreme Form of Flexible Labor,” Comparative Labour Law
& Policy Journal 31(2009): 5; Rachel Li Wai Suen, “You Sure Know How to Pick ’Em: Human
Rights and Migrant Farm Workers in Canada,” Georgetown Immigration Law Journal 15 (2001):
199.
4. Employment Standards Act (hereafter esa), 2000, so 2000, c 41.
5. Mark Tomas, Regulating Flexibility: Te Political Economy of Employment Standards
(Montréal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2009), 87.
DOI : https://doi.org/10.1353/llt.2019.0032
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exemptions and special rules, responding, in part, to employer resistance to
a universal approach to the regulation of minimum employment standards.
Despite a commitment to extend legislative coverage as widely as possible,
the system of exemptions became a key way to accommodate employers’ prerogatives for fexibility in the organization of work and its cost.6 Tis article
examines the system of exemptions as it developed in Ontario from before
the enactment of the esa in 1968 to the present. After constructing an overview of exemptions and their scope, we develop a case study of exemptions to
the overtime pay provision of the esa and its regulations and examine three
sectors in which exemptions apply, focusing on the development of the specifc
exemption, its rationale, and its implication for workers who are subject to it.7
Te focus on overtime pay has been selected for a number of reasons: it cuts
across many diferent industries as well as both the public and private sectors;
it impacts the conditions of employment for workers in precarious jobs; and
it has long been viewed as an important balancing mechanism that supports
workers’ rights. Trough this study of the overtime pay exemption, the system
of exemptions is presented as a contradictory approach to the regulation of
employment standards that, in efect, reduces es coverage, contributes to the
avoidance of key standards in the act, and undermines the goal of providing
protection for workers in precarious jobs. More broadly, we consider the extent
to which legislative and regulatory exemptions may contribute to what has
elsewhere been termed the es enforcement gap, stemming from interrelated
processes of es violation, evasion, erosion, and abandonment.8 Te article
concludes with a discussion of regulatory strategies designed to counter the
precariousness generated through legislative exemptions.

Hours of Work and Overtime Exemptions in Ontario’s ESA
Exemptions have been a part of Ontario’s esa since its inception and, as we
shall see, drew on a longer history of exemptions from minimum-standards
6. Leah Vosko, Andrea Noack & Mark Tomas, How Far Does the Employment Standards
Act, 2000 Extend and What Are the Gaps in Coverage? An Empirical Analysis of Archival and
Statistical Data (Toronto: Ministry of Labour, 2016).
7. Portions of the analysis presented in this article were conducted at the Toronto Region
Statistics Canada Research Data Centre (rdc), which is part of the Canadian Research Data
Centre Network (crdcn). Te services and activities provided by the Toronto rdc are made
possible by the fnancial or in-kind support of the sshrc, the Canadian Institutes of Health
Research (cihr), the Canada Foundation for Innovation (cfi), Statistics Canada, and the
University of Toronto. Te views expressed in this article do not necessarily represent those of
the crdcn or of its partners. Data analyses for this project were completed by Alix Holtby, Dr.
Alice Hoe, and Dr. Mark Easton.
8. Leah Vosko & Mark Tomas, “Confronting the Employment Standards Enforcement Gap:
Exploring the Potential for Union Engagement with Employment Law in Ontario, Canada,”
Journal of Industrial Relations 56, 5 (2014): 631.
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laws. In principle, the aim of the esa was to establish a (somewhat) universal
and “socially and economically acceptable” foor for certain minimum conditions of employment, as governments sought to respond to demands from
workers, trade unions, and labour federations, as well as middle-class social
reformers, for legislative workplace protection.9 Tis foor was designed, in
particular, for workers who had “limited bargaining power” and to combat
poverty that may result from low wages.10 In practice, however, and in response
to lobbying eforts by business in periods of legislative development, the form
of es regulation created by the Ontario government also sought to accommodate varying business conditions in the construction of that foor. Specifcally,
in an attempt to create a balance between the “socially and economically
acceptable,” the government aimed to ensure that businesses in the province
would not be detrimentally impacted by es legislation and to assuage business
community concerns regarding the need to develop minimum standards that
would accommodate particularities of industry and sector.11
While this article focuses on the overtime pay exemption of the current
Ontario esa, it is instructive to briefy review some exemptions in earlier provincial minimum-standards legislation, with attention to those that pertain
to hours of work and overtime, as these are illustrative of the logic and processes that produced the contemporary overtime pay exemption. Te earliest
working-time regulation in Ontario dates to Lord’s Day legislation enacted in
1845, which prohibited a range of activities on Sundays, including employment. Te original statute, applicable in Upper Canada only, exempted “works
of necessity and works of charity.”12 It was later held that because these laws
regulated morality and thus were criminal in nature the federal government,
not the provinces, had jurisdiction, and it responded in 1906 by enacting a
federal Lord’s Day Act. Although the law contained numerous exemptions,
they tended to be narrowly drawn.13 Secular working-time regulation in the
9. Ontario, Ministry of Labour, “Te Labour Standards Act, Background Memorandum,”
25 January 1968, rg7-1, fle 7-1-0-1407.3, box 47, Archives of Ontario, Toronto (hereafter
ao). A comprehensive discussion of the various factors that infuenced the government in
the development of early minimum standards legislation in Ontario is beyond the scope
of this article. For further discussion, see Mark Tomas, “Setting the Minimum: Ontario’s
Employment Standards in the Postwar Years, 1944–1968,” Labour/Le Travail 54 (Fall 2004):
49–82.
10. Ontario Task Force on Hours of Work and Overtime (tfhwo), Working Times: Te Report
of the Ontario Task Force on Hours of Work and Overtime, report submitted to the Ministry of
Labour (Toronto 1987), 26.
11. Tomas, Regulating Flexibility, 66.
12. Te Lord’s Day Act, spc 1845, c 45, s 1.
13. Lord’s Day Act, 1906, sc 1906, c 27, s 3(m); Sharon Patricia Meen, “Te Battle for the
Sabbath: Te Sabbatarian Lobby in Canada, 1890–1912,” PhD. diss., University of British
Columbia, 1979. Te law and the exemption remained in force until the legislation was struck
down as an unconstitutional infringement of the right to freedom of conscience and religion
DOI : https://doi.org/10.1353/llt.2019.0032
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province dates to the Factories Act of 1884, which regulated the working time
of women and children, setting 60 hours as a weekly maximum. Te Factories
Act was developed during a period of growing pressure for the regulation of
working time – as a result of the Nine-Hour Movement of the previous decade
– as well as the eforts of the labour movement and middle-class social reformers advocating for social protection for working women and children.14
Te 1944 Hours of Work and Vacations with Pay Act (hwvpa) was the frst
working-time legislation in the province to apply to adult workers, both male
and female.15 Introduced at the end of World War II, the hwvpa emerged in
a context of rising labour unrest in Canada, with a major strike wave toward
the end of the war, and alongside postwar labour relations legislation that
established collective bargaining rights.16 Te hwvpa established maximum
hours of work at 8 per day and 48 per week for employees in all industrial
undertakings, as well as an annual paid vacation of one week and the right to
refuse overtime.17 In that regard, it can be viewed as an example of the arc of
protective labour law from the specifc to the universal discussed by Davidov.18
However, the extent of that shift should not be overstated because, consistent
with the aim to not excessively burden businesses with government regulation, the hwvpa itself excluded supervisors and confdential employees (s. 3),
allowed the board to authorize collective agreements that established diferent standards (s. 4), allowed war industries to be exempt (s. 5), allowed excess
hours in the case of accidents or emergencies (s. 6), permitted regulations to
be made creating further exemptions (s. 10), and authorized the board to grant
ad hoc exemptions upon application in the interim between the time the act
came into force on 1 July and the end of the year (s. 14). Pursuant to these
powers, even before the act came into force, the Minister of Labour excluded
war industries (including textiles, which, for the purposes of avoiding wartime
under the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. See R v Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] 1 scr 295.
14. Tomas, Regulating Flexibility. On the Nine-Hour Movement, see John Battye, “Te Nine
Hour Pioneers: Te Genesis of the Canadian Labour Movement,” Labour/Le Travail 4 (1979):
25–56. On the role of middle-class social reformers, see Eric Tucker, “Making the Workplace
‘Safe’ in Capitalism: Te Enforcement of Factory Legislation in Nineteenth-Century Ontario,”
Labour/Le Travail 21 (1988): 45–85.
15. Hours of Work and Vacations with Pay Act, so 1944, c 26.
16. On the wartime labour struggles that led up to the establishment of postwar labour
relations legislation, see Bryan Palmer, Working Class Experience: Rethinking the History
of Canadian Labour, 1800–1991 (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1992), 278–284. See
also Leo Panitch & Donald Swartz, From Consent to Coercion: Te Assault on Trade Union
Freedoms (Toronto: Garamond, 2003). On the gendered organization of the postwar labour
and employment law regime, see Judy Fudge & Leah F. Vosko, “Gender, Segmentation and the
Standard Employment Relationship in Canadian Labour Law, Legislation and Policy,” Economic
and Industrial Democracy 22, 2 (2001): 271–310.
17. Tomas, Regulating Flexibility.
18. Davidov, “Setting Labour Law’s Coverage,” 543.
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collective bargaining regulations, had itself declared not to be a war industry).
Te minister also consulted various industrial associations and agreed that
special arrangements would be made for hotels, retail shops, and restaurants.19
When regulations were drafted later that year, numerous additional exemptions were created, including ones based both on the nature of the industry or
sector and on the recognition of a range of special circumstances. For example,
the hours-of-work maximums could be exceeded in the event of an accident,
the need for emergency work, or due to the “perishable nature” of raw materials. Te daily 8-hour maximum could be exceeded so long as an employer
did not exceed the weekly 48-hour limit. Te regulations also permitted up
to 120 hours of overtime work per year, though there was no overtime rate at
that time. Finally, there were numerous occupationally specifc exemptions,
including for professionals and persons employed in farming, commercial
fshing, frefghting, domestic service, and the growing of fowers, fruits, and
vegetables. Also exempted were funeral directors and embalmers, fshing and
hunting guides, live-in caretakers, and police.20
In setting general limits of hours of work, the hwvpa made a signifcant
contribution to the establishment of a minimum-standards foor for workers in
the province. However, the breadth of industry and occupational exemptions,
as well as the variety of special rules and excess-hours permits – which were
reported to be easily accessible – undermined the universality of the act.21 Te
Ontario Task Force on Hours of Work and Overtime (tfhwo), which in the
mid-1980s conducted the frst major review of overtime and hours-of-work
regulation since the esa was established, noted this tendency: “Te greater
stringency of the vastly extended coverage and the more stringent maximums
at eight hours per day and 48 per week were ofset, in part at least, by greater
fexibility through extensive exemptions and by downplaying the eight-hourper-day maximum where longer hours were the custom.”22
In the mid-1960s, and in the context of rising pressure from the labour
movement in Ontario for stronger legislative protections in the workplace
as well as for legislating minimum labour standards at the federal level, the
Ontario government began exploring the development of new minimum
standards legislation that would combine and update the existing patchwork
19. Labour Gazette (Sept. 1944), 1180–1181. For the controversy around the inclusion of the
textile industry in the war industry exemption, see “Te Textile Industry and the 48-Hour
Week,” Toronto Daily Star, 19 August 1944, 6. Te textile employers’ group, the Primary Textile
Institute, petitioned the board to be included. Te union representing textile workers was not
consulted.
20. Tomas, Regulating Flexibility.
21. Department of Labour, “Annual Conventions of the Ontario and Quebec Federation of
Labour,” Labour Gazette 68 (Ottawa, 1968), 78; Tomas, “Setting the Minimum,” 49; Tomas,
Regulating Flexibility.
22. Tomas, Regulating Flexibility, 25.
DOI : https://doi.org/10.1353/llt.2019.0032
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of legislative standards, including in the area of working-time regulation.23
While there were calls from Ontario’s unions for a legislated 40-hour workweek, the government was steadfast in its opposition. A memorandum in 1968
stated that “to limit hours to 40 would not only hobble industry, but would
also limit workers’ opportunities to earn overtime pay, which would reduce
their incomes.”24 Te province also began considering the introduction of a
legislated overtime premium, Ontario being one of the few North American
jurisdictions without one at the time.25
In 1968, the province enacted the esa, which took efect on 1 January 1969.26
Te act set standards regarding minimum wages, hours of work, overtime,
vacations with pay, and equal pay for equal work. Tough the act was intended
to apply to most workers in the province, and particularly those with the least
bargaining power, it also sought to strike a balance between social protection
and business interests.27 To this end, and like the hwvpa, the esa contained
numerous exemptions and special rules, including in the regulation of hours
of work and overtime.28 For example, managerial and supervisory employees
were excluded from hours-of-work restrictions, and the daily-hours maximum
could be exceeded so long as the weekly limit was not. In the event that an
employer maintained a normal workday longer than 8 hours but a workweek of
48 hours or less, the right to refuse overtime would not apply. A permit system
allowed for overtime hours to an annual maximum of 100, with the director
of employment standards able to authorize further hours depending on the
“special nature of the work performed,” or the “perishable nature of the raw
material being processed.”29
Te regulations made under the esa contained many occupationally specifc exemptions as well, again including a number that pertained to working
time.30 Te general regulation excluded regulated professionals, teachers,
23. Tomas, Regulating Flexibility.
24. Ontario, Ministry of Labour, “Memorandum Re: Employment Standards Act,” n.d. [1968],
rg7-1, fle 7-1-0-1407.2, box 47, ao; T. M. Eberlee, deputy minister, to Hon. H. L. Rowntree,
minister of labour, memorandum, 21 October 1966, rg7-1, fle 7-1-0-1156, box 36, ao.
25. Tomas, Regulating Flexibility, 66.
26. Employment Standards Act, so 1968, c 35.
27. Ontario, Ministry of Labour, “Notes for an Address by the Hon. Dalton Bales, Q.C.,
Minister of Labour for Ontario, during 2nd Reading of: Te Employment Standards Act, 1968,”
31 May 1968, rg7-1, fle 7-1-0-1407.2, box 47, ao.
28. Tomas, Regulating Flexibility.
29. R. M. Warren, executive director, Manpower Services, memorandum, 3 February 1969,
rg7-1, fle 7-1-0-1533.1, box 54, ao.
30. Canada, Department of Labour, “Recent Regulations under Provincial Legislation,” Labour
Gazette 69 (Ottawa, 1969), 108–110; Canada, Department of Labour, “Labour Legislation in
1968–69,” Labour Gazette 69 (Ottawa, 1969): 736–745. Donald Dewees notes that it is difcult
to establish a rationale or purpose for each working time exemption because “the true motive
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“commission salesmen,” persons engaged in fshing or farming, domestic servants, and secondary students from all protections except equal pay and pay
statement requirements. Managerial and supervisory employees were exempt
from the overtime pay provisions, as were telephone company employees,
fshing and hunting guides, agricultural workers who were not employed in
farming as defned in the regulation, home workers, students looking after
children, and resident superintendents in residential buildings.31 Another nine
regulations, promulgated at the same time, created special overtime rules for
specifc occupations. For example, ambulance and taxi drivers were totally
exempt, whereas highway transport drivers and seasonal fruit and vegetable
processing workers became entitled to overtime pay after 60 hours and local
cartage drivers, hotel workers, and some road-building employees got overtime pay after 55 hours.32 Other road-building employees got overtime at 50
hours, as did sewer and water-main workers, and interurban transport drivers
got overtime after 48 hours.
As the esa developed through the 1970s and 1980s, fve categories of legislated exemptions became apparent: (1) those entirely excluded from the act; (2)
those exempt from all working-time and paid-holiday arrangements; (3) those
exempt from specifc provisions of the act, including some or all working-time
provisions;33 (4) those covered by special overtime provisions allowing for an
overtime premium to begin at a threshold exceeding 44 hours (e.g. 50 hours);
and (5) those covered by special permits allowing employers to exceed the
maximum-hours standards.34 Despite the aim of the esa to extend its coverage
“to the greatest possible number of employees in Ontario,” the tfhwo, struck
partly in response to growing pressure from Ontario’s labour movement to
improve the regulation of working time, estimated that 866,000 employees
– representing approximately 25 per cent of Ontario’s paid employees – were
exempt from the hours-of-work provisions in 1986 and some 728,000 employees, or approximately 21 per cent of the paid workforce, were exempt from the
for each of the various exemptions is not clearly identifed in the Act nor in the available
documentation.” Dewees, Special Treatment under Ontario Hours of Work and Overtime
Legislation: General Issues, report prepared for the Ontario tfhwo (Toronto 1987).
31. O Reg 366/68, s. 5.
32. While exemptions were made for seasonal employees in fruit and vegetable processing,
there was reluctance to grant exemptions to all seasonal employees, because “it is often those
employees who have little or no other choice but to work in these seasonal industries who
must need the protection of our legislation.” Ontario, Ministry of Labour, “Memorandum, Re:
Representation from the Ontario Ski Area Operators Association,” 28 April 1969, rg7-1, fle
7-1-0-1532.3, box 54, ao.
33. Ontario, Ministry of Labour, Employment Standards Branch, Working Conditions and
Analysis Section, Reduction of Working Time and Job Creation, 1984, rg7-168, Policy Subject
Files, ao.
34. Tomas, Regulating Flexibility.
DOI : https://doi.org/10.1353/llt.2019.0032
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overtime provisions.35 Similarly, in the early 2000s, the Ontario Federation
of Labour estimated that approximately 20 per cent of Ontario workers were
exempt from some or all of the esa.36
As discussed, the system of exemptions was constructed to account for
particularities of occupations and industries. From the perspective of the
Ministry of Labour, the “universal application of all the basic standards is
not seen as possible” because “variations in terms of employment, types of
work, and characteristics of certain industries will always require some
exceptions.”37 Particular conditions, such as irregular hours, unanticipated
factors that may make hours unpredictable, emergencies, and employment
status, were accounted for in developing the exemptions.38 Exemptions were
also meant to both limit the government regulation of employer-employeenegotiated working-time arrangements and avoid the imposition of “severe
hardships” on employers.39 Te exemptions had often refected the lobbying
eforts of various employer associations that emphasized the unique aspects of
a particular occupation – in terms of seasonal employment, for example, or of
the potential impact of the esa on the fnancial viability of a given business.40
In addition to the various explicit exemptions from the legislated standards
in the original esa, a system of special permits provided another way in which
employers were able to exceed working-time standards.41 Like the exemptions
themselves, the special permits were introduced to account for occupational
and industry variation in work hours, so that universal standards did not constrain particular sectors where long hours were prevalent or where seasonal
variation in production required some fexibility in scheduling.42 Permits took
35. John Kinley, Evolution of Legislated Standards on Hours of Work in Ontario, a report
prepared for the Ontario tfhwo (Toronto 1987).
36. Ontario Federation of Labour, Guide to the Ontario Ministry of Labour’s Changes to the
Employment Standards Act (Bill 147) (Toronto: Ontario Federation of Labour, 2001).
37. Ontario, Ministry of Labour, “Memorandum, Re: Ontario Federation of Labour,” 6 April
1976, rg7-78, ao.
38. Dewees, Special Treatment; Kinley, Evolution of Legislated Standards.
39. Ontario, Ministry of Labour, Research Branch, “Some Questions Concerning the Purpose
of Employment Standards Legislation and Government Activities Intended to Improve Work
Conditions,” 15 December 1976, 4–5, rg7-78, ao; Dewees, Special Treatment.
40. Ontario, Ministry of Labour, “Memorandum, Ontario Swimming Pool Association,”
20 June 1975, rg7-78, ao; Ontario, Ministry of Labour, letter from Ready Mixed Concrete
Association of Ontario, 22 October 1974, rg7-78, ao; Ontario, Ministry of Labour,
“Memorandum, Re: Ontario Milk Distributors Association,” 8 January 1969, rg7-78, ao;
Ontario, Ministry of Labour, “Further Presentation of the Ontario Hotel and Motel Association
to the Industry and Labour Board for Ontario,” 16 May 1967, rg7-78, ao.
41. Tomas, Regulating Flexibility.
42. Ontario, Ministry of Labour, Program, Statistics, and Current Legislation, 1982, 16, rg778, ao.
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four forms: extended daily hours (to a maximum of 12); excess annual hours
(to a maximum of 100 extra overtime hours per year); extended excess annual
hours, permitting the scheduling of additional overtime (on top of the 100
hours) in the event of exceptional circumstances; and industry permits that
allowed for excess overtime hours in 26 industries, including construction,
ambulance service, automotive repair and gasoline service stations, baking,
fruit and vegetable processing, highway transportation, hotels/motels, restaurants and taverns, mining, retail stores, and taxis.43 Te industry permits
extended the regular work day to 10 hours and permitted additional overtime hours on top of the 100 excess annual hours for some employee groups,
though they did not exempt employees from overtime premium pay.44 Te
permit system was easily accessed by employers, meaning the esa’s cap on
regular working hours (daily and/or weekly) was exceeded with little interference from the Ministry of Labour.45
Te tfhwo, established in a context of growing layofs and unemployment for some and the persistence of excessive overtime for others, expressed
concern that the underlying principle of universality was being “traded
of against the desires of any employer” owing to the ease with which the
permits were issued.46 In essence, the permits system, which enabled employers to avoid the hours-of-work limits established by the esa, contributed to
the erosion of the foor set by the esa. Te task force recommended that the
Ministry of Labour review special rules and exemptions from hours-of-work
standards with the aim to limit exceptions and minimize special treatment.
Tis recommendation was not adopted by the Liberal government that held
ofce at the time, nor by subsequent governments in the 1990s.47
In 2000, the provincial Progressive Conservative government introduced
signifcant changes to the esa: the esa 2000 increased the maximum weekly
hours of work from 48 to 60 and expanded the practice of overtime averaging,
which allowed for the calculation of entitlement to overtime pay to be averaged
over a period of up to four weeks; it also replaced the excess-hours permits
system with a requirement that work over 48 hours per week be subject to
written agreement between employee and employer and introduced the same

43. Ontario, Ministry of Labour, Research Branch, “Legislated Hours of Work and Premium
Pay Provisions,” March 1977, rg7-78, ao; Ontario, Ministry of Labour, Labour Services
Division, Staf Branch, “Employment Standards – Overtime/Excess Hour Permits,” 6 April
1976, rg7-78, ao.
44. Te permit system was also highly utilized by unionized employers. Ontario tfhwo,
Working Times.
45. Ontario, Ministry of Labour, Research Branch, “Legislated Hours of Work.”
46. Dewees, Special Treatment, 15.
47. Ontario tfhwo, Working Times.
DOI : https://doi.org/10.1353/llt.2019.0032

THE EMPLOYMENT STANDARDS ENFORCEMENT GAP / 35

provision for “employee consent” to overtime averaging.48 With the new forms
of working-time fexibility introduced through the increased weekly maximum
and overtime averaging provisions, as well as the aforementioned provisions regarding “employee consent,” the esa 2000 contributed to enhancing
employer control over time for those workers in precarious jobs.49 Subsequent
Liberal government reforms in 2004 did not alter this trend.50
Te failure to address the problem of exemptions produced the situation
we outline below, both in general terms and with a focus on the overtime pay
exemption and special rules.

Contemporary Overtime Exemptions and Special Rules in Ontario
Broadly speaking, several categories of workers fall outside the scope of
coverage of Ontario’s esa, including the self-employed; individuals who hold
political, judicial, religious, or elected trade union ofce who are not considered employees under common law tradition; police ofcers; and those in work
programs under Ontario Works or work programs involving young ofenders
or inmates. Te esa also exempts employees who work in a federally regulated sector and who are covered under Part iii of the Canada Labour Code.
For those assumed to be formally covered by workplace standards, the reality
is less a uniform foor of workplace rights than it is a complex patchwork of
exemptions and special rules that have been incorporated into the act over
time “to introduce a degree of fexibility into the legislation which would serve
the needs of employers operating in a competitive market.”51 An employee’s
coverage under the esa hinges on a number of factors, including the type of
job he or she performs, the length of job tenure, the characteristics of employers (namely, frm and payroll size, continuous operation status, and temporary
agencies), and the personal characteristics of employees themselves (e.g.
students).52 Taken together, these exemptions and special rules result in a
patchwork of coverage leading to tenuous workplace protections for a large
proportion of workers in Ontario.
48. esa, 2000, so 2000, c 41.
49. Because this article focuses on exemptions and special rules, the provisions regarding
“employee consent” for excess hours and overtime averaging are beyond its scope. See Mark
Tomas, “Toyotaism Meets the 60-Hour Work Week: Coercion, Consent, and the Regulation of
Working Time,” Studies in Political Economy 80, 1 (2007): 105–128.
50. Employment Standards Amendment Act (Hours of Work and Other Matters), so 2004,
c 21.
51. Law Commission of Ontario, Vulnerable Workers and Precarious Work: Final Report
(Toronto: Law Commission of Ontario, 2012), 42.
52. A detailed and comprehensive discussion and analysis of esa exemptions is contained in
Vosko, Noack & Tomas, Employment Standards Act, 2000.
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In the area of overtime pay, most exemptions are occupationally specifc and
are detailed in regulation 285 of the esa. Tese include complete exemptions
from overtime pay for travelling commissioned salespersons, information
technology professionals, landscape gardeners, residential care workers, those
employed to install or maintain swimming pools, residential building superintendents, janitors and caretakers, ambulance drivers and frst aid attendants,
and farm employees involved in harvesting fruits and vegetables, among
others. Full exemptions also exist for a wide range of professionals including
doctors and public accountants. Additionally, partial overtime pay exemptions – typically enacted in higher thresholds for overtime premiums – also
exist for employees in certain occupations. Tose engaged in road, highway,
or parking lot construction and maintenance are entitled to overtime after 55
hours of work. Employees involved in the construction of bridges and tunnels
are entitled to overtime pay after working 50 hours. And, once again, employees in supervisory positions are exempt from overtime pay. Other partial
exemptions apply on the basis of workplace characteristics, where a higher
overtime pay threshold (of 50 hours) is reserved for employees in hospitality
industry workplaces who are provided with room and board and who work no
more than 24 weeks for the employer per year.53 Finally, a limited number of
full exemptions to overtime pay apply on the basis of personal characteristics
of employees. Students who are employed at a children’s camp, employed to
instruct children, or employed in a recreation program run by a registered
charity are also exempt from overtime pay.
As discussed, full and partial overtime pay exemptions run counter to the
putative legislative intent behind the original esa to provide a broad foor of
minimum protections.54 Indeed, fndings from a recent statistical analysis of
esa exemptions reveal the full extent of overtime coverage inequities among
Ontario employees.55 Only four out of every fve employees enjoy the full
beneft of overtime pay protections, while others are subject to full or partial
exemptions. As a result, it is inappropriate to think of overtime pay as a universal minimum protection. Ultimately, overtime exemptions facilitate excessive
hours without the right to refuse, which undermines job stability, job creation,
and the development of gender-equitable working-time arrangements that
allow men and women to balance work and caregiving responsibilities.56
53. According to the Special Rule tool, “Tis special rule concerning overtime pay applies
only if the employee is employed by the owner or operator of the hotel, motel, tourist resort,
restaurant or tavern.”
54. Law Commission of Ontario, Vulnerable Workers.
55. Vosko, Noack & Tomas, Employment Standards Act, 2000.
56. Judy Fudge, “Control over Working Time and Work-Life Balance: A Detailed Analysis of
the Canadian Labour Code, Part iii,” Federal Labour Standards Review Commission, February
2006.
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Looking further to the situation in 2016, we use Statistics Canada’s Labour
Force Survey (lfs) to examine non-unionized employees – the population of
interest, because they are in occupations regulated by the esa.57 Our analysis
focuses only on people’s main job in each year (for those who work multiple
jobs, this is the job in which they worked the most hours). People working
in jobs that are fully or partially exempt from overtime pay provisions were
identifed using the standardized industry (North American Industry
Classifcation System [naics 2007]) and occupation (National Occupational
Classifcation [noc-2011]) codes provided in the lfs, matched with the information provided in the Ontario Ministry of Labour’s online Special Rules and
Exemptions tool.58
Overall, 9.4 per cent of non-unionized Ontario employees reported working
more than 44 paid hours in the reference week (see Figure 1).59 Employees in
occupations that are fully or partially exempt from the esa’s overtime pay provisions were more likely than employees in occupations with no exemptions
to work overtime, with 10.8 per cent and 52.2 per cent, respectively, reporting
that they worked more than 44 hours in the reference week. Partially exempt
employees can work up to 6 additional hours each week (from 44 to 50 hours)
without full remuneration; after 50 hours, the overtime pay provision is in
efect.60
57. Te analysis excludes non-unionized workers who are covered by a collective agreement.
Tis is because the employment relationship of these workers is regulated by the collective
agreement that covers them, and they are not solely reliant on the social minimums established
by the esa. Te analysis does not include supervisors who are not coded under managers as
exempt, meaning the results likely undercapture the scope of the overtime problem.
58. Special Rules and Exemptions tool, accessed at https://www.labour.gov.on.ca/english/es/
tools/.
Te population of interest is Ontario employees aged 16 to 69 who fall under the jurisdiction
of the province’s esa, based on the industry and occupation of their main job. Residents of
institutions and persons living on reserve are excluded from the lfs sample. Tis analysis is
subject to some notable limitations in terms of what types of workers can be identifed, since
there is limited congruence between the job classifcations used by the Ontario Ministry
of Labour and the internationally comparable classifcations used by Statistics Canada. In
some cases, it was difcult to match the occupations specifed in the esa regulations with
the occupations classifed in the noc-S. Some occupations with esa exemptions, such as
swimming pool installers, are simply unidentifable in the noc-S and naics classifcations.
Other occupational exemptions were too specifc to be captured by the classifcations – for
example, the esa includes exemptions for public accountants; however, the noc-S and naics
do not distinguish between public accountants and other accountants. As a general principle,
we erred on the side of inclusion; that is, if we were not confdent that members of an industry/
occupation group were excluded from the overtime pay provisions, we assumed that they were.
Tus, these results likely underestimate the scope and efect of overtime pay exemptions.
59. All calculations regarding hours worked are based on reported paid hours. Some workers
worked additional unpaid hours – these hours are not included in calculations.
60. For one industry, construction, the overtime pay provision does not come into efect until
after 55 hours of work. Tese employees could not be defnitively identifed in the data set. For
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Figure 1. Percentage of non-unionized employees who worked more than 44 hours in
reference week.

Te number of overtime hours that people with full and partial exemptions
worked varies widely. On average, of the employees in industries that are partially exempt from the overtime pay provision who worked any overtime hours
in the reference week, they worked an average of 13.3 overtime hours. Among
this group, 16.6 per cent worked less than 6 additional hours, 37.8 per cent
worked between 6 and 12 additional hours, and 45.6 per cent worked 12 or
more additional hours in the reference week. Of the partially exempt employees who worked more than 6 additional hours, most are in transportation and
some are in construction. Employees in industries that are fully exempt who
worked any overtime hours in the reference week worked an average of 8.6
hours overtime hours. Among this group, 37.1 per cent worked less than 6
additional hours, 37.7 per cent worked between 6 and 12 additional hours, and
25.3 per cent worked 12 or more additional hours in the reference week.
Overtime pay exemptions have a substantial cost to workers in terms of
lost income. As a result of these exemptions, Ontario employees who worked
overtime in industries that are partially or fully exempt from the overtime pay
provisions of the esa potentially lose an average of 6.6 per cent of their weekly
wage in their main job.61 Employees in industries that are fully exempt lose an
average of 7.3 per cent of their weekly wage because of these exemptions, and
those in industries that are partially exempt lose an average of 4.7 per cent
of their weekly wage. Overall, 74.1 per cent of employees who work overtime
in industries that are partially or fully exempt from overtime pay regulations
all other partially exempt industry groups that could be identifed in the data, overtime pay
provisions come into efect after 50 hours of work.
61. Te data do not indicate whether employees received premium pay for the hours beyond 44
that they worked. Te analysis of lost weekly wages relies on the assumption that premium pay
for overtime was not paid if it was not required by law.
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lose 4 per cent or more of their weekly pay in lost overtime premiums; notably,
these workers are losing the equivalent of their vacation pay (or more) to overtime pay exemptions.
Since the esa’s overtime pay exemptions are based on occupation and
industry, it is unsurprising that clear sectoral trends exist in terms of who is
working overtime that may not be fully remunerated. In terms of occupation,
they are most likely to be in occupations unique to primary industry, trades
and transport occupations, and management occupations. Overall, those who
perceive their job as managerial are more likely to be working overtime that
may not be fully remunerated, likely because of the managerial exemptions
embedded in the esa. In relation to industry, those working overtime who
may not be fully remunerated are most likely to be working in agriculture,
transportation and warehousing, and construction.
Overall, it is clear that these broad and ad hoc overtime pay exemptions
have a substantial efect on workers in the province. Among the 2.6 per cent
of non-unionized Ontario employees who report working overtime that may
not be fully remunerated, roughly 730,000 hours a week are worked for which
workers are not being fully paid, representing a net gain for businesses and
a clear loss to workers. Workers may be collectively shorted more than $11
million weekly in lost wages in their main jobs because of esa exemptions for
overtime pay.62 Rather than ensuring universal minimum protection, the esa
overtime pay rules contribute to both a substantial loss of income for afected
workers and a more general erosion of the overtime pay provision of the esa.

Sectoral/Occupational Profles
We now turn to three cases to explore these dynamics in closer detail:
agricultural workers, managers, and truck drivers, all of whom are deeply
afected by the overtime pay exemption and/or special rules.
The Farm Worker Exemption
Te exemption of farm workers from protective labour and employment law is
so long-standing and pervasive that the term “farm worker exceptionalism”63
has been coined to describe their situation.64 Minimum standards regulating
62. For employees fully exempt from overtime pay standards, lost wages are calculated as the
number of weekly hours worked above 44, multiplied by 0.5 their usual hourly wage, plus 4
per cent vacation pay for employees who are so entitled. For employees partially exempt from
overtime pay standards, lost wages are calculated as the number of weekly hours worked above
44 up to the occupationally specifc threshold for overtime pay, multiplied by 0.5 their usual
hourly wage, plus 4 per cent vacation pay for employees who are so entitled.
63. See Greg Schell, Farmworker Exceptionalism under the Law, in Charles D. Tompson Jr. &
Melinda F. Wiggins, eds., Te Human Cost of Food: Farmworkers’ Lives, Labor, and Advocacy
(Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 2002), 139.
64. Farm worker exemptions apply to all harvesters and farm employees regardless of
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hours of work and minimum wages were largely a creature of the twentieth
century, although early health and safety laws, such as the Factories Act, did
set maximum hours of work for women and children. However, health- and
safety-based regulation of working time never reached agricultural workers.
Te frst working-time law to protect farm workers was Lord’s Day legislation,
mentioned earlier. Te 1845 provincial act only exempted “works of necessity
and works of charity” and made no specifc mention of farm work. Te federal
law enacted in 1906 contained the same exemption but also listed specifc
instances of such work. Although the law contained numerous exemptions,
they tended to be narrowly drawn; for example, rather than exempting farm
labourers as a class, the law excluded “the caring for milk, cheese, and live
animals.”65
Te agricultural workers exemption in the esa can be traced to the 1944
hwvpa, discussed earlier. Te act itself did not exempt farm workers, but
it allowed exemptions to be made by regulation and empowered the board
administering the act to issue interim exemptions until the end of the year.
As well, it permitted the exemption of war industries, and when announcing that the power would be exercised, Charles Daley, the Minister of Labour,
included agriculture.66 Following the end of hostilities, it was announced that
the war industries exemption would be cancelled efective 1 November 1945,
but on 19 November a new regulation under the hwvpa was fled that listed
a number of occupational exemptions, including farm workers.67 In 1952, the
regulation was amended to exclude persons employed in the cultivation of
fowers, fruits, or vegetables.68 Te situation remained unchanged over the following decades. Not surprisingly, when the minimum-standards regime was
expanded in 1968, farm worker exceptionalism continued, yet in a somewhat
more nuanced fashion. Farm workers in general were excluded from the esa,
except with regard to its equal pay, wage protection, and enforcement proviresidency status, including temporary foreign workers. See Leah Vosko, Eric Tucker &
Rebecca Casey, “Enforcing Employment Standards for Migrant Agricultural Workers in
Ontario, Canada: Exposing Underexplored Layers of Vulnerability,” International Journal
of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations 35, 2 (2019): 227–254. Our focus here
is on their exemption from hours of work and overtime laws, but it is worth recalling that
in Ontario farm workers were exempted from occupational health and safety regulations
until 2006 and from workers’ compensation until 1965; further, they remain exempted from
the province’s general collective bargaining statute and instead have been covered by the
Agricultural Employees Protection Act since 2002 – an act so inefective that no collective
bargaining relationship has ever been established under its auspices. Tese exemptions are
dealt with at great length in Tucker, “Vicious Circle of Precariousness”; Tucker, “Farm Worker
Exceptionalism.”
65. Hours of Work and Vacations with Pay Act, so 1944, c 26.
66. Davidov, “Setting Labour Law’s Coverage,” 1180–1181.
67. “Another Pledge Kept,” Globe and Mail, 17 October 1945, 16; O Reg 92/45.
68. O Reg 102/52.
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sions. However, the defnition of farming was modifed to exclude many of its
more industrial operations in which permanent employees were hired, such as
egg grading, fax processing, greenhouse and nursery operations, and mushroom growing. Workers in these identifed industries, therefore, were covered
by the esa, but they were subject to specifc exemptions, which included exclusion from the act’s hours-of-work and overtime provisions. Seasonal workers
employed in fruit and vegetable processing were subject to a separate regulation that entitled them to overtime pay after 60 hours, instead of 48 hours
– then the norm under the act.69 Tere have been some minor tweaks since
that time, but the picture has not changed fundamentally. Current regulations
exempt farm workers engaged in primary production from most protections,
subject to special rules for vegetable, fruit, and tobacco harvesters (rules that
do not include an entitlement to overtime pay). As well, workers in related
areas not captured by the more general exclusion are specifcally exempted
from hours-of-work and overtime pay provisions, including those employed
in the growing of mushrooms, fowers, sod, trees, and shrubs, breeding and
boarding of horses, and keeping of fur-bearing animals.70
To date, we have not found evidence of any challenge being made to these
exemptions or of any serious attempt to justify them.71 John Kinley, who in
1987 wrote the frst detailed analysis of the farm worker exclusion from the
work-time provisions of the esa, noted, “Te development of exemptions
seems to have occurred without detailed analysis of the reasons given for
requesting them.” 72 Kinley identifes the major rationales for farm worker
exceptionalism: variability of the weather, perishability of products, difculty
of recording hours of work on farms, and the inability of farmers to meet the
costs that would result.73 Of these four rationales, the frst two do not justify
the overtime exemption and the third really does not seem to justify anything
at all. Tat leaves the issue of cost as the sole rationale for exempting farm
workers from overtime pay. Kinley’s focus, however, is much more on hoursof-work regulations than overtime entitlements and so does not subject this
rationale to much scrutiny other than to accept that farmers face a price/cost
squeeze.74
69. Tomas, Regulating Flexibility; O Reg 366/68, s 1, 4 & 5; O Reg 374/68.
70. O Reg 285/01.
71. One of the only policymakers to address farm worker exceptionalism was William
Meredith, the chief justice of Ontario, who wrote the report that was the basis for Ontario’s
frst no-fault workers’ compensation scheme. Meredith stated that while in principle farm
workers should be covered, he doubted whether public opinion would support their inclusion
and so did not try to have them covered. See Tucker, “Vicious Circle of Precariousness.”
72. Kinley, Evolution of Legislated Standards, 49.
73. Kinley, 49.
74. Kinley, 52–57, 69, 72.
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Te agricultural exemption from hours of work and overtime provisions was
also considered by Michael Tompson in his 1994 review of British Columbia’s
minimum-standards regime. Like Kinley, he notes that the rationale for the
exemptions is not given but points to the fact that much agricultural production is seasonal. Tompson links seasonality to the overtime exemption by
arguing that overtime premiums encourage employers to hire more labour.
However, he points out that farmers already experience serious difculties
hiring sufcient numbers of seasonal workers and that “the Commission is
convinced that workers expect to work extra hours during the busy season to
increase their incomes.” 75 As a result, he supports continuation of the agricultural worker exemption, subject only to the imposition of an upper limit of 10
hours a day and 60 hours a week.
Te farm worker exemption from overtime therefore seems to rest entirely
on an argument about the economics of farming in Ontario. On the one hand,
to the extent that Ontarians adopt a cheap food policy, it is being borne on the
backs of agricultural workers who may be asked not only to work exceptionally long hours but to do so at low wages and without entitlement to premium
pay for those excess hours. On the other hand, to the extent the justifcation is
that we have no choice because of competitive pressure from even lower-cost,
less regulated American and now Mexican producers, or producers from the
Global South, the consequence is that agricultural workers are again paying
the cost of free trade policies. In either event, defending the overtime exemption on the basis of these policies seems particularly problematic when the
result is to further disadvantage and make more vulnerable a group of workers
who already sufer disadvantage in the labour market because of their social
location and immigration status. Tompson’s argument that the only rationale for overtime premiums is that it discourages long hours overlooks the
additional rationale that workers who are subject to long hours of work are
entitled to be paid at higher rates because of the burden it places on them
physically, mentally, and socially. Te fact that workers may expect or desire
to work long hours to increase their incomes, especially when employed on
a seasonal basis, may provide some justifcation for permitting longer hours,
but it does not explain why those workers should be deprived of premium pay.
While it may be true that agricultural workers do not expect premium pay for
overtime hours, they may have been conditioned not to expect it by the very
exemption that their diminished expectation supposedly justifes.
Agricultural employees comprise 10.2 per cent of all employees who work
overtime that may not be fully remunerated.76 On average, agricultural
75. Michael Tompson, Rights and Responsibilities in a Changing Workplace: A Review of
Employment Standards in British Columbia (Victoria: Ministry of Skills, Training and Labour,
1994).
76. Te proportion of agricultural workers surveyed in the lfs is likely an underestimation
in relation to overall overtime work. Te survey sampling frame only includes temporary
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workers report longer weekly hours of overtime work than those in other
industries, working an average of 12.2 hours a week of overtime that may not
be fully remunerated, in comparison to less than 8 hours a week for workers
in other industries. It is clear that the doctrine of farm worker exceptionalism
contributes to a labour environment in which overtime work has become an
expected part of the job. Te relation of the agricultural overtime exemption
to the economics of farming in Ontario is quite apparent when the total cost
of the overtime pay exemptions is assessed: across all agricultural workers, the
exemption from overtime pay provisions of the esa results in a potential loss
of almost a million dollars (over $990,000) in unpaid overtime premiums each
week. Te price of food in Ontario is efectively being unwillingly subsidized
by these workers who labour long hours in precarious employment without
the same remuneration paid to other Ontarians.
Managerial Exemptions
In Ontario, the overtime exemption for managers can be traced to early
legislation governing hours of work and eating periods. Te 1944 hwvpa
exempted individuals in management positions. Tat exemption, however,
was narrowly defned, applying to persons whose duties “are entirely of a
supervisory, managerial or confdential character and do not include any work
or duty customarily performed by an employee.” 77 Te managerial exemption
– but not the exemption of persons employed in a confdential labour relations
capacity78 – was incorporated into the esa in part by statute (hours of work,
s. 7(2)) and in part by regulation (overtime, O. Reg 366/68 (1 Jan. 1969)). In each
case, the scope of the exemption was worded a bit less stringently than in the
hwvpa (“employee whose only work is supervisory or managerial”), but the
gist was the same.
In applying the managerial exemptions, employment standards ofcers
(esos) and Ontario Labour Relations Board (olrb) ofcials focused on the
work an individual performs rather than the terms of their employment contract, job description, or title. Tey consider evidence of the capacity to make
management decisions, supervise others, hire and fre others, and conduct
performance reviews, among other tasks. Additional considerations are the
foreign workers if they identify their Canadian dwelling as their usual place of residence.
Temporary foreign workers comprise a very small proportion of lfs respondents. Te category
of agricultural workers also includes some respondents who provide support services for
agricultural work.
77. Davidov, “Setting Labour Law’s Coverage.”
78. It is interesting to speculate as to whether the exclusion in the hwvpa was inspired by the
managerial and confdential labour relations exclusion in Canada’s Wartime Labour Relations
Regulation (PC 1003, s 2(1)(f)), promulgated on 17 February 1944. Te hwvpa was introduced
shortly after, on 3 April. Te heated debate in the United States over whether management
should be excluded from collective bargaining is explored in detail in Jean-Christian Vinel, Te
Employee: A Political History (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013).
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frequency of and time spent performing non-managerial activities. Despite
the word “only,” a number of olrb decisions have interpreted this regulation
to allow an individual manager to engage in non-managerial activities and still
be considered a manager exempt from overtime pay.79
Tis exemption was reworded in 2001, stipulating that overtime exemptions
apply to individuals “whose work is supervisory or managerial in character and
who may perform non-supervisory or non-managerial tasks on an irregular or
exceptional basis.”80 According to the esa policy and interpretation manual,
the wording change aimed “to clarify that the managerial exemptions can
apply even if the individual is not exclusively performing managerial or supervisory work.”81 In applying the exemption, the olrb frst determines whether
the work was managerial or supervisory in character, focusing on the characteristics noted previously. If it is determined that the character of the work
was managerial, the olrb then determines whether non-managerial tasks
were performed on an irregular or exceptional basis, and the outcome often
hinges on the interpretation and application of these terms. One approach is
to defne these terms narrowly. According to the ruling of Tri Roc Electric
Ltd. v Butler, “the clear implication is that the regular performance of nonmanagerial duties in the ordinary course of an employee’s work renders the
exemption inapplicable. Such approach is consistent with the well-accepted
principle of statutory construction holding that limiting or exempting provisions in remedial legislation are to be narrowly construed.”82 However, other
cases take a less restrictive view. For example, in Glendale Golf and Country
Club Limited v Sanago the board held that notwithstanding that an executive chef performed non-managerial work regularly because the kitchen was
often understafed, the exemption still applied because the performance of
this work was exceptional.83 Te case also interpreted and applied an obscure
subsection of the esa’s overtime provision stating that when an employee performs both exempt and non-exempt work in a week, the employee is entitled to
overtime for hours in excess of 44 if the exempt work constitutes less than half
their working time.84 Tus, in Sanago the board found that the executive chief
was entitled to overtime in those weeks where the exceptional performance of
non-managerial work constituted more than half his hours worked.
79. See Singer v McMaster University, 2001 Canlii 16376 (on lrb). See also Kennedy v
William C. Cavell Enterprises Ltd., [1987] OJ No 1050; Ideal Parking Inc, [1999] osead No 58.
80. O Reg 285/01 s 8(b), emphasis added.
81. Ontario, Employment Practices Branch, Employment Standards Act, 2000: Policy and
Interpretation Manual (Toronto: Carswell, 2003), 31-21.
82. Tri Roc Electric Ltd. v Butler, 2003 Canlii 1390 (on lrb). See also Baarda v Plywood and
Trim Co. Ltd., 2004 Canlii 16978 (on lrb).
83. Glendale Golf and Country Club Limited v Sanago, 2010 Canlii 4265 (on lrb).
84. esa, 2000, so 2000, c 41, s 22(9).
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Despite the long history of the managerial exemption, there has been very
little discussion of its justifcation, as Kinley discovered in his 1987 investigation of exemptions.85 However, in constructing post hoc rationales Kinley
pointed to the following, which are arguably applicable to the managerial
exemption: “strong bargaining position of the exempted worker based on skill,
high level of responsibility, and/or organization; maintenance of independence and status of managerial, professional, and skilled groups; the high cost
of observing hours standards.”86 Tompson’s 1994 review of the es in British
Columbia briefy stated that the rationale for the managerial exemption was
that “they have some power to control their own hours of work.” He also noted
that “structural changes in the economy have blurred the distinction between
managers and their subordinates somewhat. In some organizations, managers
are asked to do non-managerial work at times when their staf would be entitled to premium pay.” He recommended retaining the managerial exclusion
but applying it only when individuals are acting in a managerial capacity.87
Over one-third (36.1 per cent) of Ontario employees who work overtime that
may not be fully remunerated perceive their job to be managerial. Te overtime pay exemption for managers is responsible for the largest total loss to
workers in terms of overtime remuneration: $5 million a week, collectively.
While some of these managers are highly compensated, others earn low
wages. For example, among managers in full-service restaurants and limitedservice eating places – who comprise 4.0 per cent of all managers in Ontario
(the second-largest group, after those in computer systems design) – 17.1 per
cent earn low wages.88
We are inclined to accept the general rationale for the exclusion; however,
like Tompson we are concerned about the erosion of its boundaries and the
expansion of its reach, which gives rise to the problem of classifcation or misclassifcation. As we have seen, the legal defnition of the managerial exclusion
has been broadened and the olrb is not consistent in interpreting its limits
narrowly. Tis helps to create an atmosphere conducive to misclassifcation of
employees as managers as an evasion strategy for employers in the province.
Te Ontario Ministry of Labour’s 2013 retail enforcement blitz emphasized
managerial misclassifcation as a priority for inspectors. Te phenomenon is
widespread. For example, in the United States, the extent of managerial misclassifcation is underscored by two nationwide surveys of nursing homes
conducted by the US Department of Labor in the late 1990s. Tese surveys
established a compliance level of 70 per cent in 1997 and only 40 per cent in
85. Kinley, Evolution of Legislated Standards.
86. Kinley, Evolution of Legislated Standards, 22.
87. Tompson, Rights and Responsibilities, 98.
88. Following the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (oecd), low
wages are calculated as less than two-thirds of the median wages of full-time employees in
Ontario.
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1999, and cited overtime violations related to misapplied managerial and professional exemptions as key factors in such low compliance rates.89
Trucking, Trade, and Transport Special Provisions
Trucking, trade, and transport make up another occupational group with differential rules regarding overtime pay. Work in this industry has been covered
by working-time regulations in the form of maximum weekly hours of work to
protect the safety of not only drivers but also the general public, as long hours
of work may impair a driver’s ability to operate a vehicle. Yet the industry is also
subject to cyclical and seasonal variation, as well as intense competitive pressures. Tese factors, in conjunction with industry lobbying, have prompted
the development of special provisions in overtime regulation, which allow for
greater fexibility in the organization of working time for drivers and increase
the weekly hours of work compensated without an overtime premium. In
the 1980s, the tfhwo undertook a special examination of the trucking and
transportation industry, given the complex nature of the industry and the proliferation of special rules governing its working conditions.90 We focus on the
industry here for similar reasons.
With regard to coverage of trucking and transport occupations, legislative
jurisdiction over employment conditions has been characterized by special
provisions as well as a long-standing source of uncertainty in terms of the
interpretation and enforcement of overtime regulations.91 Te standards of
Ontario’s esa apply if an employee’s work is to be performed in Ontario or if it
is to be performed “outside Ontario but … is a continuation of work performed
in Ontario.”92 Because of the cross-border nature of the trucking industry,
there is potential overlap with coverage under the Canada Labour Code (clc),
which sets minimum standards for workers in federally regulated industries,
including those engaged in work of an interprovincial nature. For transport
workers covered by the clc, the esa does not apply. Additionally, those who
work as owner-operators are not covered by the esa.
As of 2016, there were 205,157 people employed in transportation industries
in Ontario, with approximately 31 per cent of these employees either union
members or covered by a collective agreement. Of the non-unionized employees in transportation industries, approximately 49 per cent were employed in
truck transportation and are therefore impacted by the esa overtime provisions discussed below.
89. United States Department of Labor, Employment Standards Administration, Wage and
Hour Division, 1999–2000 Report on Initiatives (Washington, DC, 2001), 20.
90. Fred Lazar, Trucking Industry and the Worktime Provisions of Ontario’s Employment
Standards Act, report prepared for the Ontario tfhwo (Toronto 1987).
91. Lazar.
92. esa, 2000, so 2000, c 41, s 3(1).
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Under the esa, two categories of employees in trucking, trade, and transportation industries fall under special rules for overtime pay: highway transport
truck drivers, defned as those “employed to drive trucks used in most ‘for hire’
trucking businesses, other than local cartage businesses”; and local cartage
drivers and driver’s helpers, defned as those “employed as drivers of vehicles in
a business that carries goods for hire within a municipality (or not more than
fve kilometres beyond a municipality’s borders)” and those employed as their
helpers.93 When the esa was originally enacted, these workers were covered
under the industry permits that established special provisions for excess
hours and through regulations that increased the threshold for the overtime
premium. Initially, the overtime premium was payable after 60 hours in the
highway transport industry and after 55 hours in the local cartage industry
(later reduced to 50 hours).94 With the removal of the industry permits system
through the esa reforms of 2000, both groups of workers received special provisions governing their overtime hours that replicated these conditions. Under
the esa 2000, highway transport truck drivers are entitled to overtime pay for
hours in excess of 60 in a workweek, while local drivers and their helpers are
entitled to overtime pay for hours in excess of 50 in a workweek.95
Te special provisions for overtime pay – which allow for standard rates
of pay for hours of work beyond the normal overtime threshold – are longstanding, yet we must set them in the context of recent processes of broader
regulatory reform in the North American trucking industry to fully grasp
their implications. In trucking, regulatory reform includes the rewriting of
industry-specifc regulations to enhance market/competitive forces,96 which
coincided with alterations to more general laws that govern employment relations (afecting union organizing, collective bargaining, wage rates, and other
minimum employment standards) and the inefective enforcement of those
laws, as well as the implementation of the (former) North American Free Trade
Agreement to reduce the regulation of cross-border trade.97 Tese processes
– which, for the trucking industry, date to the late 1970s – have heightened
competitive pressures in price setting and furthered industry restructuring,
thereby intensifying problems of low wages, long hours of work, and unsafe
working conditions. Experiencing a decline in mileage rates, drivers are
compelled to drive faster and work longer hours to compensate for income
93. In addition, taxi cab drivers are not entitled to overtime pay. O Reg 285/01, s 8(j).
94. Canada, Department of Labour, “Labour Legislation in 1968–69.”
95. O Reg 285/01, s 18; O Reg 285/01, s 17.
96. Tis included the passage of the Motor Carrier Act in the United States in 1980 and
the Motor Vehicle Transport Act in Canada in 1987. See Daniel Madar, Heavy Trafc:
Deregulation, Trade, and Transformation in North American Trucking (Vancouver: UBC Press,
2000).
97. Michael Belzer, Sweatshops on Wheels: Winners and Losers in Trucking Deregulation
(Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2000); Madar, Heavy Trafc.
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shortfalls. Tese tendencies have been exacerbated through the growth of
owner-operators in the industry, which itself has an efect of heightening competition between trucking companies and among drivers themselves in much
the same ways as the presence of subcontracting does in other industries.98
Tere are several rationales for the special treatment of truckers under
the esa working-time provisions generally, and the overtime pay provisions
specifcally, all of which relate to the nature and organization of the trucking
industry.99 First, the diverse nature of the industry, which includes short- and
long-distance carriers as well as trucking companies and independent owneroperators, has given rise to multiple working-time regulations that refect this
variation, with diferent regulations for hours of work and overtime for these
diferent groups. Second, the industry is often subject to environmental constraints, including weather and the seasonal nature of some goods, creating
the general need for greater fexibility in working time and, in particular, long
hours of work. Customer practices in terms of just-in-time inventory systems
also factor into the pressures for longer working hours, as does increased
competition generated by trucking industry deregulation. Te avoidance of
overtime pay is also justifed in terms of the expectation and assumption that
long hours are a necessary part of the work, particularly in highway transport.
Additionally, employers in the industry have voiced concerns that excessive
working-time regulation (i.e. through limits to weekly hours and/or a lower
threshold for overtime pay) could hamper competitiveness.
Together, truckers comprise 18.8 per cent of employees who work overtime
that may not be fully remunerated. Truckers who worked overtime in the reference week worked an average of 5.4 hours that may not be fully paid.100 Of
these truckers, 17.0 per cent worked less than 6 additional hours, 35.3 per cent
worked between 6 and 12 additional hours, and 47.7 per cent worked 12 or
more additional hours in the reference week. Collectively, the overtime pay
exemption for truckers potentially costs truck drivers over $900,000 each
week and likely much more.
Given the intersection between decent working conditions (which include
the right to overtime pay and limits on weekly hours of work) and public safety
created through trucking, the rationales for the special rules on overtime pay
are concerning. As a lower overtime threshold could have the efect of reducing excess hours, changing the special provisions could not only improve
working conditions for drivers but also contribute to public safety. Lowering
98. Harry W. Arthurs, Fairness at Work: Federal Labour Standards for the 21st Century
(Ottawa: Federal Labour Standards Review, 2006).
99. Dewees, Special Treatment.
100. Tese fgures are very likely underestimations. It is not possible to clearly distinguish
between highway transport drivers and local cartage drivers using the naics classifcation
structure that is used in the lfs. Given our principle of erring on the side of inclusion, all truck
drivers were assessed as if overtime premiums became available after 50 hours a week.
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the overtime pay threshold could also counter some of the aforementioned
trends in trucking work, specifcally, the tendency of declining wages that contributes to excess hours, resulting from industry restructuring. It is important
to note, however, that a change of this nature would not address the conditions
of independent owner-operators, who are not entitled to overtime pay due to
their independent contractor status. A more comprehensive strategy to regulate the working conditions of owner-operators would be required, such as
that proposed by the Federal Labour Standards Review, which recommended
using sectoral conferences to develop special regulations for “autonomous”
workers such as owner-operators in trucking.101

Conclusion
This article began by raising the prospect of an es coverage crisis involving
an increasing selectivity in coverage of employment law.102 Selective coverage,
however, is not new. Trough an investigation of the history of exemptions
in Ontario’s minimum-standards laws, we revealed long-standing tendencies
for certain groups of workers to be fully or partially exempt from minimum
standards or to be subject to special rules that efectively create diferential
standards that are lower than those experienced by the majority of workers.
Tese exemptions and special rules have accommodated employer demands
to be able to continue to organize work in ways that maximize proft. Not
surprisingly, we found that this tendency shaped the esa, in that the Ontario
government responded to intense demands for special treatment from employers in particular industries.
In light of the broader tendency toward precarious employment, these
exemptions can clearly be seen to intensify the overall erosion of es by subjecting workers to market forces with little or no regulatory protection. Rather
than a uniform foor of minimum workplace rights, through exemptions
and special rules, es are thus better conceptualized as a patchwork of rights
applied unevenly across the labour market. In addition to this general concern,
through a detailed focus on the overtime pay exemption in terms of its overall
application, we were able to quantify the impact of this diferential treatment.
Specifcally, approximately 1 of every 40 non-unionized Ontario employees report working overtime that may not be fully remunerated because of
the esa’s overtime pay exemptions, totalling over 730,000 hours a week that
workers may not be fully paid for, for a sum of potentially over $11 million
weekly in lost wages. Moreover, given the negative health efects of excessive
working hours, the overtime exemption and special rules for certain occupations, such as farm workers and truck drivers, may pose health risks to both
the afected workers and the general public. Tough the system of exemptions
101. Arthurs, Fairness at Work.
102. Davidov, “Setting Labour Law’s Coverage.”
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is and has been justifed in terms of the need to attend to the special characteristics of specifc sectors, industries, and occupations, we contend that in
light of the connections between exemptions and precariousness in the labour
market, this approach to es regulation needs to be rethought.
In recent years, as the organizing of non-unionized workers through organizations such as the Workers’ Action Centre has increased pressure on the
Ontario government to improve minimum standards, the government has
taken legislative measures to extend the scope of es coverage to certain, traditionally poorly protected groups, including temporary foreign workers,
live-in caregivers, and temporary agency employees. In 2015, as a result of the
growing attention placed on precarious employment, the Ontario government
appointed the Changing Workplaces Review to consider how to respond to
the growth of precarious employment. Te special advisers recommended legislative changes and a review of esa exemptions and special rules designed
to augment employment standards and their enforcement. In 2017, the government implemented many of the recommendations in the Fair Workplaces,
Better Jobs Act and commenced a review of special rules and exemptions.103
However, refecting the historical tensions we identifed at the outset, in 2018
the recently elected Conservative government promptly repealed many of the
changes made by the 2017 legislation and ended the review of exemptions and
special rules.104 As a result, the narrowing of exemptions has been minimal.
Te fndings of this article, in terms of both the material impact of the overtime exemption specifcally and the broader connections between exemptions
and the spread of precarious employment, support the impetus for a more
universalist approach to es regulation by eliminating selective treatment that
undermines workplace protection.105 Specifcally, reversing the “coverage
crisis” requires an approach to es regulation that reasserts the principles that
initially gave rise to such standards – these being the need for labour-market
protections premised upon universality, fairness, and social minimums. Tis
reversal need not take the form of identical standards for all workers. In fact,
ensuring a fair social minimum through expanding es coverage could also
103. C. Michael Mitchell & John C. Murray, Te Changing Workplaces Review: An Agenda for
Workplace Rights – Final Report (Toronto, May 2017); Fair Workplaces, Better Jobs Act, so
2017, c 22.
104. Making Ontario Open for Business Act, so 2018, c 14.
105. Under President Obama in the United States, some eforts were made by the US
Department of Labor to narrow or eliminate the scope of some unprincipled exemptions. Such
eforts included new rules to narrow the criteria for overtime and minimum wage exemptions
for “white collar” employees, as well as modifcations to an exemption that excluded home care
workers from minimum wage and overtime protection under the Fair Labor Standards Act. On
the “companionship exemption” for healthcare workers, see National Employment Law Project,
“Federal Minimum Wage & Overtime Protections for Home Care Workers,” fact sheet, updated
September 2015, https://www.nelp.org/wp-content/uploads/NELP-Fact-Sheet-CompanionshipRules-Reform.pdf.
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be accompanied by additional regulations and resources targeted at groups
of precariously employed workers in ways that address the circumstances
that heighten their precariousness, such as those discussed above in agricultural, managerial, and trucking occupations (though a full discussion of such
a strategy is beyond the scope of this article).106 Nevertheless, we contend that
revising es regulation in a manner that broadens coverage, and eliminates
special rules that contribute to an erosion of social minimums, would constitute a meaningful step toward countering precariousness in industrialized
labour markets.
Te research for this article was funded by a Partnership Grant titled
Closing the Employment Standards Enforcement Gap: Improving Protections
for People in Precarious Jobs. We are grateful to the Social Sciences and
Humanities Research Council of Canada for its support and to members of the
larger research team for their comments on an earlier version of the article.

106. See Guy Davidov, “Special Protection for Cleaners: A Case of Justifed Selectivity,”
Comparative Labor Law & Policy Journal 36 (2015): 219.
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